SIGNED.



Dated: September 29, 2005

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In re	) Chapter 7
DENNIE DEWAINE MEADOR aka RED MEADOR; RED'S PLACE,	) CASE NO. 0-04-00929-RJH
Debtor.	
WILLIAM E. PIERCE, Chapter 7 Trustee, Plaintiff,	ADVERSARY, NO. 05-00151
v. LOLA MEADOR,	MEMORANDUM DECISION RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
	)  A.F. Pierce ("Trustee") for the Debtor Dennie

Dewaine Meador ("Debtor") filed this adversary proceeding against the Debtor's ex-wife, Lola

Meador, seeking authority to sell jointly owned property pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 363(h).

The complaint alleges that the 1985 decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the

for and Lola effectively gave them joint ownership of a house and real property in Kearns,

Jiah by virtue of the following language:

That/the house and real property located at 4666 West 5415 South, Kearns, Utah, is awarded to the Plaintiff [Lola Meador] as her sole and separate property, and that the Defendant [Debtor] is solely liable to keep current all mortgage payments thereon in the approximate amount of \$350; further, that Defendant [Debtor] shall have the right to approve any offer of sale of the house and real property, and that in the event of the sale of the house and real property, each party is awarded one-half of any equity existing therein.

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Lola Meador has moved for summary judgment, primarily based upon a January 2000 Quit Claim Deed that the Debtor executed in favor of Lola Meador purporting to "remise, release and quitclaim" to her "all of the right, title, interest and claim" that the Debtor had "in and to the following described parcel of land, and improvements and appurtenances thereon." In addition, Lola Meador's motion relied upon an affidavit executed by the Debtor stating that it was his intent that the Quit Claim Deed conveyed all interest in the property that he had been awarded pursuant to the divorce decree, and that as of the time he filed the bankruptcy petition he did not intend to claim any interest in the property.

To counter the Debtor's affidavit, the Trustee relies on testimony given by the Debtor in a 2004 examination, which suggests that the only purpose of the Quit Claim Deed was to permit Lola Meador to use the entire ownership interest in the house as collateral for loans. In addition, the Trustee relies on subsequent subordination agreements signed by the Debtor, which recite that the Debtor had an equitable tien on the property exeated by the divorce decree to the extent of one-half of the equity interest in the home.

The Court finds and concludes that there is a fact dispute as to whether the intent and effect of the Debtor's Quit Claim Deed was to waive any claim he may have had against Lola Meador arising out of the divorce decree with respect to the home or any equity in it. Consequently it is possible, when those facts are resolved, that the Trustee may have a contingent claim against Lolaz Header, but it is contingent upon her sale of the house. Because the house has not been sold, the Trustee has no presently enforceable claim against Lola Meador personally.

There is no fact dispute, however, that (1) the divorce decree did not grant the Debtor any legal or equitable interest in the property itself, as distinguished from an interest in the proceeds upon its sale, and (2) the Quit Claim Deed effectively divested the Debtor of any legal or equitable interest in the real property that he might have had. Moreover, the divorce decree never gave the Debtor a right to compel a sale of the residence, and certainly his Quit Claim Deed to Lola Meador could not have given him any greater rights than he originally had under the divorce decree, even if those rights had not been waived by the giving of the Quit

Claim Deed. 1 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Lola Meador is entitled to partial summary 3 judgment as against the Trustee to the extent this adversary proceeding seeks an order 4 authorizing or compelling the sale of the home. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Lola Meador's motion for partial summary judgment to the extent that she sought an order to the effect that the Trustee has no claim against 6 7 her on account of the Quit Claim Deed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Trustee's motion for summary 8 9 judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because the Frustee's sontingent claim against 10 Lola Meador, if any, has not been resolved by this decision, this is not a final, appealable order. 11 12 DATED AND SIGNED ABOVE 13 Copy of the foregoing faxed 14 this 29th day of September, 2005, to: 15 Allison M. Lauritson, Esq. 16 Lane & Nach 2025 North Third Street, Suite Phoenix, AZ 85004 17 Attorneys for Plaintiff Fax: (602) 258-6003 18 19 Dean A. Stuart, Esh Gust Rosenfeld 201 East Washington, Suite 800 Phoenix, AZ 85004 2327 Fax: (602) 254-4878 2.0 21 22 Assistant 23 24 25 26 27

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